Date: 13 Mar 2000
Time: 11:37:44
Remote Name: 156.29.145.175
EXECUTIVE COURAGE AND BEHAVIOR: AN EMPIRICAL CROSS-CULTURAL INVESTIGATION
Jafar Alavi, East Tennessee State University, Department of Economics, Finance, and Urban Studies, Box 70686, Johnson City, TN 37614-0686, 423-439-4455, drjalavi@etsu.ed
Mahmoud M. Yasin, East Tennessee State University, Department of Management and Marketing, Box 70625, Johnson City, TN 37614-0625, 423-439-5877, mmyasin@etsu.edu
Thomas W. Zimmerer, Breech School of Business Administration, Drury College, 900 N. Benton, Springfield, MO 65802, 417-873-7241
Jo?o Lisboa, Avenida Dias Da Silva, 165 Faculdade De Economia, Universidade Coimbra, 3000 Coimbra, Portugal
ABSTRACT
This study represents an effort to gain insights into the differences between Portuguese executives and their Iranian counterparts with regard to their attitudes toward the impact of executive courage on the operational and strategic facts of business organizations in these two different cultural settings. Toward that end, eighty Portuguese and thirty-one Iranian executives are surveyed. The results seem to indicate that the executives from these two cultural settings are operating under different cultural, economic and governmental realities which are influencing their perceptions of the role of executive courage in their organizations.
INTRODUCTION
Cultural facets and variables tend to have profound impact on business and managerial practices in a given culture. Iran and Portugal are two distinct cultures which have some similarities and significant differences. These two countries, share some fundamental cultural values such as the impact of religion on the society and the strong family orientation, as well as experiencing similar economic challenges in the recent past. These similarities withstanding, Iranian and Portuguese executives operate under different economic, political and social constraints. While some of these may be culturally based, most are attributed to political and economic differences. Business executives are the product of their cultures. Therefore, one would expect the Iranian culture relative to its Portuguese counterpart to influence business and managerial practices differently. Specifically, these two cultures may have different interpretation, practices and perceptions of the role of executive courage in the business organization.
The objective of this research is to empirically examine the behaviors, attitudes and perceptions of Portuguese and Iranian executives with regard to the role of executive courage in their organizations.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
The research hypotheses for this study are divided into three groups. Group A addresses the effects of acts of executive courage on both the executives who take them and the climate of the organization in which these acts occur. Group B is concerned with the limits on executive courage in organizational settings. In this context, executives' willingness to act courageously, in spite of superiors' opposition, and the personal risk associated with such actions and behaviors, are examined. Group C addresses the nature of the relationship between organizational rewards and courageous acts.
Group A: Does executive courage positively affect individuals and organizational climate?
HA1. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their attitudes to whether executives should be expected to act beyond their personal interest, when making business decisions.
HA2. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their attitudes to whether acts of executive courage tend to strengthen the character of those executives who take them.
HA3. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their attitudes to whether acts of executive courage tend to earn executives the respect of their subordinates.
HA4. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their attitudes to whether visual displays of executive courage tend to build a positive organizational culture.
Group B: Is executive courage associated with the need for personal growth or a concern for the organizational interest?
HB1. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their attitudes to whether personal growth or personal courage is more important in a business setting.
HB2. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their attitudes toward willingness to champion acts or decisions knowing that their superiors oppose such actions or decisions.
HB3. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their attitudes toward willingness to take actions which they think are in the best interest of the organization's long term effectiveness even if doing so means the organization would experience three consecutive years without profit.
HB4. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their willingness to strategically reposition their firm's competitive position if needed.
Group C: Does the organization reward acts that are courageous in nature or acts that are only associated with fewest mistakes?
HC1. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their belief that managers are rewarded for identifying problems and acting upon them.
HC2. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to their belief that the reward systems in their organizations tend to reward the most those who only make the fewest mistakes.
HC3. There is no difference between Iranian executives and their Portuguese counterparts with regard to whether acts of executive courage lead to promotion.
METHOD
Sample and Procedure
Thirty-one Iranian executives participated in this study. These executives were reached by one of the authors and asked to participate in this study. After explaining the purpose of the study, one of the authors supervised the distribution of the research instrument and was available to answer questions. The participants in this study were all executives at the president and vice-president level across a broad range of industries in the public as well as the private sectors. The Portuguese sample consisted of eighty executives of the 1000 largest Portuguese manufacturing firms. The data collection procedures was similar to the procedure used for the Iranian executives.
Measurement
The research instrument used to measure executives' attitudes toward and experiences with executive courage and its effect on the organization was based on the work of Yasin and others (1989). Participants were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with various statements that corresponded to the research questions. In some questions, positive responses would indicate strong agreement with the underlying construct, while other questions were worded so that positive responses would indicate disagreement. In addition, the instruments asked the respondents to provide written comments on their perceptions of what executive's courage entails.
RESULTS
Results of Hypotheses Testing
To shed light on the differences between Iranian and Portuguese executives with regard to their attitudes, perceptions and views of the role of executive courage in their organizations, three groups of research hypotheses were tested using a series of Chi Square tests (i.e., test of difference in proportions). These results are reported and examined next.
Results Related to Group A Hypotheses
Based on the results in Table 1, HA1 is rejected. This indicates that Portuguese executives more so then their Iranian counterparts tended to think that executives should be expected to act beyond their personal interest. This difference may be explained by the strong influence of the Iranian government over the Iranian business sector (i.e., exchange control). Such influence may limit Iranian executives from achieving their personal potential.
Hypothesis HA2 was not rejected. It can be concluded, therefore, that both groups of executives equally tended to think that acts of executive courage tend to strengthen the character of those executives who take them.
Hypothesis HA3, was not rejected. Again, both groups of executives agreed on the positive impact of executive courage acts in terms of earning the respect of subordinates.
Hypothesis HA4 was rejected. Thus, more so than their Iranian counterparts, Portuguese executives tended to associate acts of executive courage with building a positive organizational climate. This difference may be attributed to the heavy involvement of the Iranian government in business organizations where most industries are run by government or Quasi Government entities. In such environment, executives may not see how these actions can lead to positive contributions.
Results Related to Group B Hypotheses
Hypothesis HB1 was not rejected. No significant difference was detected among the two groups of executives with regard to whether personal growth or personal courage is more important in business. Although the difference was not statistically different, Iranian executives through personal growth is more important.
Hypothesis HB2 was rejected. This means that Portuguese executives were more willing to champion acts knowing that their superiors are opposed to such action relative to their Iranian counterparts. This finding is also attributed to the governmental influence of the Iranian business culture which leaves executives with very little job security.
Hypothesis HB3 was rejected . Therefore, it is concluded that Portuguese executives were more willing to take a decision which is in the long term interest of the organization even though such a decision may have negative short term impact relative to their Iranian counterparts. This finding enforces the findings reported so far which has to do with role of the Iranian government in business. Such role appears to be limiting the ability of Iranian executives to manage their organizations effectively.
Hypothesis HB4 was rejected. Therefore, it is concluded that Portuguese executives more so than their Iranian counterparts were willing to take bold actions to strategically reposition their firms competitively. This finding is consistent with the finding firm HB3.
Results Related to Group C Hypotheses
Hypothesis HC1 was not rejected. Although not statistically significant, the Portuguese executives were more inclined to believe that executives are rewarded for identifying problems and dealing with them relative to their Iranian counterparts.
Hypothesis HC2 was rejected. Therefore, it is concluded that Portuguese executives tended to think that reward systems in their organizations tended to reward those who make the fewest mistakes relative to their Iranian counterparts. This finding may reflect that the fact that Iranian executives believe that whether they make the fewest mistakes or take risky actions, they are not rewarded either way due to the governmental influence as their organizations.
Hypothesis HC3 was rejected. This means that Portuguese executives tended to attribute their promotion to their acts of courage more so than their Iranian counterparts. This finding is consistent with the earlier findings dealing with the role of the Iranian government in the business sector.
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The results in general seem to be consistent with the cultural and economic realities of Iran and Portugal. Due to the significant involvement of the Iranian government in the Iranian economy, many organizations are finding it rather difficult to operate as their counterparts in a more open economy. Thus, Iranian business organizations in comparison to their Portuguese counterpart may not be rewarding bold risk takers. Also, under the economic conditions which Iran has been experiencing, executives may find it very difficult to ignore personal growth in favor of personal courage. While Iranian executives like their Portuguese counterparts appear to value decisions and actions which are consistent with the notion of executive courage, they are reluctant to ignore their own personal interest. Iranian business organizations unlike their Portuguese counterparts appear not to rewarding executives for risk taking aimed at improving the long term competitiveness of the organization. In this context, Iranian executives unlike their Portuguese counterparts are finding it necessary to take care of their own personal interests. In the current Iranian business environment, job security and personal growth concerns may take a priority over absolute organizational commitment and executive courage. Nevertheless, Iranian executives like their Portuguese counterparts place a high value on the visual displays of executives courage. Perhaps this is a reflection of the Iranian culture. In a culture which fought an eight-year war, economic embargo, and other hardships acts of courage are always viewed positively.
Iranian business executives have operated under very difficult economic and cultural environment, however, the worse appears to be behind them. As the Iranian government scale down its involvement in the Iranian economy, with across the board privatization of industries, Iranian business executives will return to their pre-revolution mode of operation.
References and tables are available upon request from first author. http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/Docs/proceedingsIII/99wds310.htm