Date: 04 Mar 2000
Time: 17:50:49
Remote Name: 24.30.137.96
03/06/2000 Page 1 Copyright (C) 2000 Middle East Newsletters; Source: World Reporter (TM)
Although focused on domestic priorities at present, the broad array of reformists in the Iranian parliament know that Washington is central to the success of Iran 's foreign policy agenda. What President Khatami has called the transition in Iranian -Arab Gulf relations "from detente to confidence building and then to lasting bilateral co-operation in the region" can only come about with the assistance of the US.
The already improved atmosphere in the Gulf could yet see Iran 's pre-eminent Leader Sayyed Mohammed Khamanei perform the Haj in Mecca this year. Omani and Iranian officers will continue to observe each other's military manoeuvres, while trade opportunities will continue to expand, especially if Iran 's domestic reform programme successfully challenges vested economic interests.
However the US-backed Gulf security structure will continue to have a dual, if albeit nuanced, focus on Iran as well as Iraq, unless Washington-Tehran relations change significantly. What then are the prospects of this happening?
Possible Steps
A number of moves could be made by either side, some of them not requiring the expenditure of huge amounts of political capital. Inside Iran , those reformists congregating around Khatami's brother, Mohammed Reza, would be more willing than most to make gestures toward Washington. However, this is unlikely to occur quickly. Across the Iranian political spectrum there is a consensus that Iranian gestures must be matched by concrete actions by Washington, notwithstanding a recognition among Iranian observers of the US scene that any such actions are unlikely this side of the US Presidential election.
Indeed, the US electoral arena may even make rapprochement harder. Within days of the Iranian election the US Senate unanimously approved the Iran Non-Proliferation Act which will target supplier countries, with Russia particularly in mind. The US Administration will no doubt water down the Act but will not be able to veto it.
However, there are moves that Washington might be prepared to make on sanctions, and indeed some have already been foreshadowed. The Iran -Libya Sanctions Act remains officially in force until 2001. However Anglo-Dutch firm royal Dutch/Shell, for example, is pursuing oil concessions without fear of legal action in US courts. European-US differences on Iran have in effect obligated a more flexible stance on the part of Washington.
Pistachios and Persian Rugs
The US Administration signalled last year that sanctions restrictions could accommodate wheat exports, in order to help ailing US farmers. The overlap of Congressional representation of farmers and a willingness in the US body politic to look a little more sympathetically on Iran after the elections could enable progress on this issue.
Iranian exports of pistachios and Persian rugs would, however, need to be part of the package. For the US this could be very beguiling as, unlike assistance to the Iranian oil industry, these items do not benefit the state but the bazaaris, who are among the most earnest advocates of privatisation in Iran .
The difficulty with Iranian purchases of wheat is that these could become tied up with money Iran claims the US owes for weapons bought under the Shah. Using trade as a normaliser in Iran -US relations also goes to the heart of a challenging issue for domestic Iranian reformers: i.e. the degree of state and/or clerical control of the economy. The problem is that opening up such trade ties could involve an acrimonious and heated public debate inside the Islamic Republic.
Using public funds to buy American goods when Iran alleges that it is still owed money would be difficult. Resolving the claims, however, would definitely facilitate movement on trade. Iran might then agree to the relatively low visibility US proposal to open a consular section at the Swiss embassy in Tehran. While the outcome of the Majlis elections has increased the likelihood of such moves in response to US initiatives, they will not occur if the Iranian government risks being portrayed as weak.
Swaps
Larger US moves, such as allowing Iranian oil swaps, will be slower to emerge given concern that this can directly assist the state funding of "terrorism", including opposition to the Middle East Peace Process, as well as the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
These issues are likely to prevent substantial rapprochement this side of a new US presidency and will continue to handicap progress afterwards. While Iran is likely to make further moves on challenging internally related terrorism, support for what in Iran is seen as the legitimate national struggle of Hizbollah will not be withdrawn, whoever is in power in Tehran. For this to cease being a block on US- Iranian relations, Syria and Israel will first have to conclude a peace deal, thereby negating the need for Iranian support for Hizbollah's armed actions.
In the meantime, rhetorical changes may be found on Iranian attitudes to the Palestine question. However, meetings with Hamas and Islamic Jihad officials, although no indicator of significant Iranian support, cannot be ended this side of an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty without seeming like capitulation to the US.
Iraq Card
Iraq is a significant card that will form part of the low level official dialogue between Iranians and Americans likely to occur next year, providing Iran 's pride is satisfied on its claims and/or progress on sanctions. If Iran believes that normalisation with the US would not be dependent on normalisation between Washington and Baghdad, then it could be willing to consider concessions on at least parts of its WMD programme.
Iran 's sense of isolation in the Caspian region could also be eased with an end to US blocks on international finance for oil and gas pipeline deals that go through Iran . Washington is willing to trade this for movement on WMD but not yet.
While the US will wish to see Iranian action on at least some WMD programmes, it will know that military sanctions make the relative cheapness of biological and chemical weapons attractive to Tehran. Furthermore, a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace is unlikely to make Tehran feel any easier about Israel's capabilities.
Other Options?
Despite US pressure, Iran 's missile programme is unlikely to be scaled back and there is little sign of North Korean and Russian assistance ending. Iran 's nuclear ambitions are unlikely to be discouraged, so long as Russia enjoys the financial and strategic benefits that assistance on such programmes provides.
China too is improving its relations with Iran and may, depending on Beijing's relations with the US, opt for closer military support in the future. Iran is also quietly improving relations with India, with whom it shares strategic concerns regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. Full-scale military alliances are however unlikely, especially if Iran feels its backyard interests are being respected by the US.
Gulf Detente
Iran will continue to pursue detente with the GCC states but significant developments are unlikely without progress on relations with the US. For example, the necessary downgrading of Iran 's military presence on the three islands claimed by the UAE would be portrayed as weakness in the face of US power in the Gulf. Iran 's relations with the European Union will also continue to develop but Tehran sees these as adding pressure to the need for better relations with the US.
Ultimately, improved relations with Washington are crucial to substantial foreign investment and if Iran is to resume what it sees as its rightful place in the regional order.
Although the results of the Majlis elections have eased the way to improved elections, the US presidential election cycle is likely to delay rapprochement. Beyond the US presidential election, President Khatami's own re-election campaign in 2001 may also limit the pace of change. Small steps can be expected but no dramatic breakthroughs are likely in the near future.